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1. Introduction
This decision by the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice is characterized
by an unusual factual situation resulting in a legal dilemma for the referring
court. That court had to decide whether to annul a programme adopted in
accordance with one EU directive because no environmental assessment
had been carried out as required by another directive. The problem was that
if the programme were annulled, the Member State would be in breach of
the first directive; whereas if it was upheld the breach of the other directive
would persist. The judgment raises important questions of national pro-
cedural autonomy, whether procedural requirements can be overridden by
substantive considerations and, more generally, whether there is a right for
Member States to derogate from directives. It is argued that by allowing the
Member State to temporarily uphold the validity of the programme the
Court has reached the correct conclusion, albeit on the basis of an un-
satisfactory argument.
2. The dispute and questions referred
This decision is the final one in a series of judgments concerning the
Belgian Region of Wallonia’s failure to transpose Directive 91/676/EEC
concerning pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources.1 The facts
can be summarized as follows. In February 2007, the Region of Wallonia
adopted the “contested order” in reaction to a judgment by the Court of
Justice rendered in September 2005, which had found Belgium in breach of
1. Directive 91/676/EEC, O.J. 1991, L 375/1; late transposition of this Directive has been
widespread and gave rise to 56 infringement proceedings overall; see Krämer, EC
Environmental Law, 6th ed. (Sweet and Maxwell, 2007), p. 287.
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its obligation to transpose Directive 91/676/EEC in time because the Region
of Wallonia had failed to adopt the necessary measures to implement Article
3(1) and (2) and Article 5 of the Directive.2 Article 5 requires Member
States to adopt action programmes in respect of vulnerable zones designated
under Article 3, with the aim of reducing water pollution caused or induced
by nitrates from agricultural sources and of preventing further pollution.
Nitrates are mainly introduced into groundwaters as a result of the intensive
farming of livestock and the fertilization of land, in particular with manure.
The Court of Justice found that the Region of Wallonia had failed to
identify all groundwaters which were or could be affected by pollution and
to designate vulnerable zones.3 The Region had also failed to take account
of coastal waters in identifying waters and designating vulnerable zones.4 In
addition, the action programmes in respect of designated vulnerable zones
had been adopted too late.5
The contested order was based on Article 5 of Directive 91/676/EEC and
lays down an action programme providing rules on the management of
nitrogen in vulnerable zones.6 The claimants, two environmental
organizations, applied for annulment of this order to the Belgian Conseil
d’Etat, which in the course of those proceedings made two preliminary
references to the Court of Justice. The first reference in those cases concerned
the question whether the contested order should have been subjected to an
environmental assessment in accordance with Directive 2001/42/EC on the
assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the
environment.7 The Court’s answer was in the affirmative,8 which meant that
the contested order had been adopted contrary to EU procedural requirements.
The question arising in the second reference, which is the subject of the
present case comment, related to the exact consequences of this breach, in
particular whether the Conseil d’Etat would have to annul the contested
decision or whether it could uphold it temporarily. The Conseil d’Etat had
noticed that if it annulled the contested decision with retroactive effect, as
would normally be required, it would leave the Belgian legal order in the
Region of Wallonia without any measure transposing Directive 91/676 until
the contested order was re-drafted.The result would be that Belgiumwould be
2. Case C-221/03 Commission v. Belgium, [2005] ECR I-8307.
3. Ibid., para 77.
4. Ibid., para 92.
5. Ibid., para 136.
6. Joined Cases C-105/09 & C-110/09, Terre wallonne and Inter-EnvironnementWallonie,
[2010] ECR I-5611, para 23.
7. Directive 2001/42/EC, O.J. 2001, L 197/30.
8. Terre wallonne and Inter-Environnement Wallonie, cited supra note 6, para 55.
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in breach of its obligations under that Directive in the meantime. In view of
this dilemma, the Conseil d’Etat asked the following question:
“Can the Conseil d’État,
– seized of an action seeking the annulment of the [contested order],
– finding that that order was adopted without compliance with the
procedure prescribed by Directive 2001/42 . . . and that it is, for that
reason, contrary to the law of the European Union and must be annulled,
– but finding at the same time that the contested order provides for an
appropriate implementation of . . . Directive 91/676 …,
defer in time the effects of the judicial annulment for a short period
necessary for the redrafting of the annulled measure in order to maintain
in European Union environmental law a degree of specific imple-
mentation without any break in continuity?”
3. The Opinion of theAdvocate General
Advocate General Kokott’s argument chiefly revolved around the law on the
procedural autonomy of the Member States and on whether the principles of
equivalence and effectiveness would be violated if the referring court
upheld the contested order temporarily. Given that Belgian procedural law
provides for invalid rules of domestic law to remain temporarily in force,
the principle of equivalence would not be violated.9 Consequently, her
argument centred on the principle of effectiveness, in particular whether
maintaining the action programme laid down in the contested order would
render it excessively difficult to exercise the right to an environmental
assessment.10 The Advocate General pointed to the key difference between
annulling the consent given to an individual project for lack of an envi-
ronmental assessment and annulling a plan or programme. While the former
will cease to have any effects, the latter will be replaced by the pre-existing
regulatory regime or earlier provisions, which may be less advantageous to
the environment.11 In view of the objective of Directive 2001/42 to ensure a
high level of protection of the environment, consideration must be given to
the consequences of annulling a plan or programme adopted in violation of
that Directive.12 Where the rules applying in lieu of the annulled measure
were less advantageous to the environment, the referring court would be
9. Opinion of A.G. Kokott, para 33.
10. Ibid., para 36.
11. Ibid., para 41.
12. Ibid., para 43.
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allowed to uphold the measure temporarily without violating the principle
of effectiveness.13 As a result, the Advocate General proposed that the Court
should allow the Conseil d’Etat to uphold the contested decision, provided
that the provisions which would apply if the contested decision were
annulled are more disadvantageous for the environment than the contested
measure.
4. The judgment of the Court
The Court of Justice’s judgment in many ways echoes the Advocate
General’s Opinion. Regrettably it is far less clearly structured and con-
sequently not an easy read. The Court first had to deal with a challenge to
the admissibility of the reference, against the background that the Walloon
Region had in the meantime adopted a new order, which had been preceded
by an environmental assessment as prescribed by the Directive. The new
order also repealed the contested order but provided that all orders
implementing the contested order should be kept in force until revoked by
their author.14 The Court was quick to refute the European Commission’s
argument that in view of the new order the reference had become devoid of
purpose. Referring to settled case law, it re-affirmed that it can only refuse
to rule on a question where the question bears no relation to the facts of the
main action, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court has not
been supplied with the facts and legal material necessary to answer the
question. Given that in response to an enquiry by the Court of Justice, the
Conseil d’Etat still considered an answer necessary, the Court declared
the reference admissible.15
In response to the substantive question the Court held that in view of the
specific circumstances of the case, the Conseil d’Etat was exceptionally
authorized to maintain certain effects of the contested decision. However, this
authorizationwas subject to four conditions. First, the contested decisionmust
be a measure correctly transposing Directive 91/676/EEC. Second, the
adoption and entry into force of the new decision do not enable the adverse
effects on the environment resulting from the annulment of the contested
decision to be avoided. Third, the annulment of the contested measure would
result in a legal vacuum in relation to Directive 91/676/EEC, which would be
more harmful to the environment. Finally, the effects of the measure are only
maintained for the period of time strictly necessary to remedy the irregularity.
13. Ibid., para 43.
14. Judgment, para 30 et seq.
15. Ibid., paras. 33–38.
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TheCourt first referred to settled case law according towhich each organ of
aMember State is required by virtue of the duty of loyal cooperation laid down
in Article 4(3) TFEU to nullify the unlawful consequences of a breach of
European Union law.16 It concluded that a national court had therefore to
annul a plan or programme adopted in breach of Directive 2001/42 (on
environmental impact assessment). Otherwise the fundamental objective of
that Directive would be disregarded.17 The precise way in which such
nullification had to happen was a matter of domestic law. The Court
highlighted the procedural autonomy of the Member States, which entailed
the use of their national procedural rules provided that these ruleswere not less
favourable than those governing similar domestic situations and that they did
not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights
conferred by the EU.18
The Court then turned to the question whether using a national procedural
provision tomaintain the contested ordermight be justified in this case in view
of the potential legal vacuum described above. The Court made explicit
reference to the fact that the referring court did not rely on economic grounds
in order to be authorized to derogate from the duty to annul the provision of
national law. Rather, it pointed to the specific features of the case before it, in
particular that the aim of achieving a high level of protection of the
environment as provided for inArticle 191(2)TFEUmay in this case be better
achieved bymaintaining the effects of the contested order for a short period of
time rather than by retroactive annulment.19 The Court regarded this
consideration relating to the protection of the environment to be overriding, so
that it exceptionally authorized the Conseil d’Etat to maintain certain effects
of the contested order under the conditions set out above.
5. Comment
The Court’s admissibility decision is in line with its case law on the
admissibility of requests for a preliminary reference and does not come as a
surprise. The dispute had not in fact ceased to be of relevance when the
reference was made as the contested decision still produced legal effects,20
so that this part of the decision is entirely convincing. The Court’s judgment
16. Ibid, para 43; see with regard to Directive 85/337/EEC on environmental impact
assessment, O.J. 1989, L 175/40: Case C-201/02,Wells, [2004] ECR I-723, para 64.
17. Judgment, paras. 46–47.
18. Ibid., para 45.
19. Ibid., para 56.
20. This can e.g. be contrasted with C-241/09, Fluxys, [2010] ECR I-12773, where the
dispute had been withdrawn as far as the interpretation of EU law was concerned.
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is of interest mainly for the unusual legal and factual background and the
Court’s pragmatic but seemingly unprincipled conclusion. It is regrettable
that the Court’s reasoning remains thin and lacks clear guidance on
precisely why and on what doctrinal basis the conclusion was reached. It
appears that the main concern for the Court was to come to a solution which
would avoid what it termed a “legal vacuum”.21 This case comment seeks to
determine the basis of the Court’s decision by posing three related
questions: first, whether the Court’s approach was based on its case law on
national procedural autonomy; second, whether the decision means that
procedural obligations can in some situations be overridden by substantive
considerations; and third, whether the decision implies that there is a right
for Member States to derogate from directives.
5.1. A question of natural procedural autonomy?
The Court’s reasoning appears to rest on its case law on national procedural
autonomy, to which it made explicit reference.22 It is recalled that it is
generally for the national courts to ensure the application of European
Union law. In doing so they may apply national procedural rules but subject
to two caveats: the national rules must be no less favourable than those
governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and they
must not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise
of rights conferred by the EU legal order (principle of effectiveness).23 The
key question here was whether the principle of effectiveness would be
violated if the national court were allowed to uphold the contested decision
on a temporary basis. The Advocate General suggested that this would not
be the case if the provisions applying in lieu of the contested decision were
less advantageous to the environment than the contested decision. It seems
that the Court had this argument in mind when making its judgment. But the
Court’s reasoning lacks the clarity of the Advocate General’s argument and
is potentially confusing. It commences by mentioning national procedural
autonomy,24 muddies the waters by pointing to the constitutional dilemma
of a possible legal vacuum,25 and then seemingly returns to its original
reasoning by pointing out that the national court had at its disposal a
domestic procedural provision which would allow it to temporarily uphold
the contested decision. It is suggested here that the reference to procedural
21. Judgment, para 56.
22. Ibid., para 45.
23. Ibid., para 45.
24. Ibid., paras. 45–46.
25. Ibid., para 56.
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autonomy is misplaced. This is because the case is different from typical
cases where national procedural autonomy and with it the principles of
effectiveness and equivalence are normally relevant. In most of these types
of cases decided by the Court, the main question was whether a national
court would be allowed to apply its mandatory procedural rules where
application of these rules stood in the way of a full application of EU law.26
The situation in the present case differs in two respects. First, the question
here was about the application of an exceptional and non-mandatory
procedural rule rather than of the ordinary procedure. Belgian procedural law
only exceptionally allows for the effects of an annulled provision to be
maintained for a certain period. The Conseil d’Etat would thus not have been
under any constraint by national procedural law if it had declared the contested
decision void. This option clearly existed. But the Conseil d’Etat wanted to
make use of the exception and uphold the illegally adopted contested order.
Second, the case is further different in that the reasons advanced for applying
this exceptional rule were not reasons found in the domestic legal order but
ones found in the EU’s own legal order. Normally, the question for the Court
is whether a rule of national law, which limits the full effectiveness of EU law,
can be invoked before a domestic court. Examples would be the adequacy of
limitation periods27 or of monetary remedies.28 Here, the only reason put
forward was that if the contested order were to be annulled, Belgium would
(again) be in violation of its duty to implement Directive 91/676/EEC. In light
of these differences, it is not entirely surprising that the Court’s reasoning is
lacking in structure and in principle since the starting point for its analysis is
questionable.
5.2. Can procedural obligations be overridden by substantive
considerations?
While the theoretical basis for the Court’s decision is somewhat dubious,
one can ask more generally whether the Court has paved the way for
procedural obligations to be overridden by substantive considerations. It is
clear from the Court’s decision in Wells that Member States must generally
ensure that an environmental assessment is carried out.29 This duty is of a
procedural nature. Where a planning decision has been made without a prior
26. A detailed analysis of the Court’s case law on national procedural autonomy can be
found in Craig, EUAdministrative Law, 2nd ed. (OUP, 2012) pp. 703 et seq.
27. Case 33/76, Rewe Zentralfinanz,[1976] ECR 1989; Case C-208/90, Emmott, [1991]
ECR I-4269.
28. Case 14/83, von Colson and Kamann, [1984] ECR 1891.
29. Wells, cited supra note 16, paras. 64–65.
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assessment, Member States must normally nullify the unlawful conse-
quences of such a decision, even if it was substantively in compliance with
environmental law requirements. They are thus obliged to remedy a
violation of the duty to carry out an environmental assessment, usually by
revoking or suspending the planning decision. The question is whether the
Court’s judgment provides national authorities and courts with an excuse to
ignore the consequences of such a breach by pointing to overriding
substantive considerations, i.e. whether the Member State may derogate
from its duty to disapply a national measure adopted in breach of an
obligation under a Directive. In Inter-Environnement the Court was careful
to re-emphasize that Wells is still good law and it has extended Wells to the
environmental assessment under Directive 2001/42/EC.30 It would thus be
wrong to interpret Inter-Environnement as a generally applicable exception
to Wells, which would allow for a decision to stand without an environ-
mental assessment if substantive considerations override the formal re-
quirements laid down in Directive 2001/42/EC.
The exceptional character of the Court’s ruling is echoed in the fourth
condition for upholding the contested order, which may only be maintained
for as short a time as possible. With this the Court aimed to ensure that an
environmental assessment must be carried out even if the substance of the
decision is likely to remain unchanged. Yet it is worthwhile contrasting the
case ofWellswith the case under discussion here.Wellswas concerned with a
mining permission for a concrete mining project and not with a plan or
programme. The Advocate General pointed out the important difference
between decisions granting planning consent and plans and programmes,31
which are essentially of a legislative nature. Where consent for a concrete
project has been granted in violation of the duty to carry out an environmental
assessment, the consent can be revoked without further consequences for the
environment. In contrast, where a plan or programme is concerned, that plan
or programme is replaced with the prior regime, which may be less favourable
to the environment.With this distinction in mind, the case cannot be read as an
unconditional weakening of the Court’s strict stance regarding procedural
requirements. But it may be asked whether for situations in which plans and
programmes are in violation of procedural requirements, the Court has opened
the door for substantive considerations to be taken into account. In any event,
the case’s exceptional factual situation will have to be considered when
referring to this decision as a potential precedent.
30. Judgment, paras. 43 and 46.
31. Opinion, para 42.
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5.3. A new right to derogate from Directives?
A further question is whether the Court’s judgment has consequences
outside the area of environmental law, in particular whether the Court has
created a more general right to derogate from directives. In order to place
this question into context, it is helpful to compare and contrast the decision
discussed here with two other recent judgments, Winner Wetten and
Commission v. Poland, in which the Court was faced with similar questions
of derogation.32 Winner Wetten concerned a German ban on bets on sporting
competitions, which the referring court considered illegal in view of the
Court’s earlier decision in Gambelli.33 A similar ban had also been held to
infringe the German constitution by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal
Constitutional Court).34 Instead of declaring the ban unconstitutional with
immediate effect, the Bundesverfassungsgericht decided to temporarily
uphold it in order to allow the legislator to impose a new ban in compliance
with constitutional requirements. A similar order had earlier been made by a
different administrative court with regard to the legislation at issue. That
court had been aware of the ban being contrary to EU law and argued that
upholding it would prevent the existence of a legal void.35 In view of this
the referring court asked whether it would be compatible with EU law to
uphold the ban temporarily. The Court of Justice replied that by virtue of
Article 264 TFEU it had jurisdiction to indicate which effects the annulment
of a Union measure should have. Where overriding considerations of legal
certainty existed, suspension of an annulment could be justified.36 It argued,
however, that even if one assumed that suspension of an annulment of a
national measure could happen in the same circumstances, there was a lack
of overriding considerations of legal certainty in the case before it so that a
suspension was not possible.37 Surprisingly, in the case annotated here the
Court does not mention Winner Wetten even though the Advocate General
dedicated four paragraphs of her Opinion to it.38 The question is whether
the situation in Winner Wetten is comparable to the present case. It is argued
that the cases differ for a number of reasons. The first difference is that the
cases arose in different contexts. Winner Wetten is essentially a case
32. Case C-409/06, Winner Wetten GmbH v. Bürgermeisterin der Stadt Bergheim, [2010]
ECR I-8015; Case C-185/10, Commission v. Poland, Judgment of 29 Mar. 2012, nyr.
33. Case C-243/01, Gambelli, [2003] ECR I-13031.
34. BVerfG 1 BvR 1054/01.
35. WinnerWetten, cited supra note 32, para 26.
36. Ibid, para 64–66; e.g. applied in Case C-402/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International
Foundation v. Council and Commission, [2008] ECR I-6351, paras. 373–376.
37. WinnerWetten, cited supra note 32, para 67.
38. Opinion, paras. 20–23.
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concerning the primacy of EU law. The question was whether a national
court may under certain circumstances derogate from its Simmenthal
obligation to disapply national law which is in conflict with EU law.39 The
reason put forward in Winner Wetten was that otherwise there would be a
legal vacuum in national law, which, in the eyes of the referring court, ought
to be avoided. Thus the issue was solely rooted in the legal order of the
Member State, which for public policy reasons desired to ban bets on
sporting competitions. In contrast, Inter-Environnement does not deal with
domestic concerns but with concerns of EU law. The legal vacuum which
would exist if the contested decision were to be annulled would have been
in violation of an EU Directive. Whereas in Winner the annulment of the
ban on bets led to a situation perfectly compatible with EU law, the
annulment in Inter-Environnement would have led to a situation in which
the Member State would have been in breach of EU law. Thus Inter-
Environnement was not concerned with the primacy of EU law over national
law but with two obligations both stemming from EU law.
The recent decision inCommission v.Poland, handed down only onemonth
after Inter-Environnement concerned a different issue, which is also relevant
for this analysis. After accession to the EU, Poland had maintained in force a
law on medicinal products, which, under certain conditions, allowed for the
marketing of such products in Poland without prior marketing authorization.
This law contradictedArticle 6(1) of Directive 2001/83, which stipulates that
medicinal products may not be placed on the market without market
authorization according to a number of EU Regulations.40 The aim of the
Directive is to facilitate trade between theMember States and to protect public
health.41 Against this background it also provides for a mutual recognition of
marketing authorizations. Thus the Polish law had the potential of
endangering the aims of the Directive. The bone of contention in this case was
a provision in the law which stated that marketing authorization did not need
to be obtained for a product which contains the same active substance as a
product already authorized but the price of which is more “competitive”, i.e.
lower. Thus Poland solely put forward economic reasons in order to argue for
derogation from a duty contained in the Directive. Public health concerns,
which would have been in the spirit of the Directive, could not be invoked by
Poland since the law only provided for the importation of products which
already had equivalents on the market.42 The Directive itself contains a
39. To that effect cf. Case 106/77, Simmenthal, [1978] ECR 629, para 24.
40. Regulation (EC) No 726/2004, O.J. 2004, L 136/1 and Regulation (EC) No 1901/2006,
O.J. 2006, L 378/1.
41. Opinion of A.G. Jääskinen in Commission v. Poland, cited supra note 32, para 19.
42. Ibid., para 53.
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derogation provision in caseswhere therewas a specialmedical need to import
an unauthorized product in an individual case. It is hardly surprising that the
court concluded that these conditions were not met. The Court further did not
accept the more general argument that financial considerations should allow
for derogations from duties contained in Directives.43While the Court did not
question the Member States’ competence to organize the finances of their
health systems, it pointed out that they must do so in accordance with the
provisions of EU law.44 In view of this reasoning, the Court’s explicit
statement that the referring court in Inter-Environnement did not rely on
economic grounds to argue for derogation from the duty to nullify the
contested decision is more intelligible.45 Rather the Court pointed to the fact
that protecting the environment was one of the essential objectives of the
Union.46
The Court’s remark prompts three interrelated questions.The first question
is how to identify such essential objectives. It is immediately connected to the
second question of why economic considerations do not constitute such an
objective. The third question is whether Inter-Environnement would have had
a different outcome if, in a similar factual scenario, the two directives had not
had as their objective the protection of the environment. Turning to the first
question, one can observe that according toArticle 3TEU the protection of the
environment is one of the aims of the Union. Does it therefore follow that all
the objectives mentioned in Article 3 TEU are essential in that sense? This
would lead to an inflation of “essential” objectives so that it is unlikely that this
is what the Court had in mind. One possible way of distinguishing between
essential and non-essential objectives might be whether there is an explicit
legislative competence for an objective, which would make it essential. This
would certainly be the case with environmental protection. But other
objectives mentioned in Article 3 TEU are the promotion of peace and the
well-being of the Union’s peoples, for which there is no explicit competence
of the Union. Would that mean that they are not essential? Another possible
explanation of the essential character of the protection of the environment
might be that according to Article 11 TFEU environmental protection
requirements must be taken into account across all of the Union’s policies.
This provision certainly accords a special status to environmental protection
and it is likely that the Court had Article 11 TFEU in mind. But it is
unfortunate that the Court does not reveal what exact distinction the adjective
“essential” denotes and one is left to guess.
43. Commission v. Poland, cited supra note 32, para 46.
44. Ibid., para 47.
45. Judgment, para 57.
46. Ibid.
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Turning to the second question, it seems that the Court does not consider
financial considerations to be “essential”. They are not mentioned among the
objectives inArticle 3TFEU and there is no clause similar toArticle 11TFEU
providing for their being taken into consideration across policy areas. But
especially during the current financial crisis the financial health of a Member
State is of great concern to the Union.This can be seen fromArticle 126TFEU
which demands that Member States avoid excessive deficits. The same will
soon be reinforced by the Treaty Establishing the European Stability
Mechanism.47 So it can hardly be argued that a Member State’s desire to keep
a tight budget is not of concern to the EU. It is suggested that in reality the
distinction should not be one between essential and non-essential objectives of
the Union, since such a distinction would be so vague that it would be
impossible to maintain. Rather the distinction should be one between
considerations intrinsic to EU law and considerations intrinsic to the Member
States’ legal orders. Viewed through this lens, one can see that, rather like in
the case of Winner Wetten, where a legal void in the national legal order was
put forward as a justification to derogate, the case of Commission v. Poland
differs from Inter-Environnement in that financial considerations are
considerations internal to the Member State so that they cannot justify
derogation from EU law. Member States have other means than infringing EU
law at their disposal in order to ensure sound finances, e.g. raising taxes or
cutting spending without violating EU law. In contrast, the reason why the
Court in Inter-Environnement allowed Belgium to derogate from Directive
2001/42/EC was to avoid the frustration of the aims of another EU Directive.
It was thus intrinsic to EU law. The cases can further be distinguished in that
in Commission v. Poland a failure to annul the Polish legislation would have
led to a violation of EU law. Annulment was the only way of ensuring
compliancewith EU law.Unfortunately, the Court failed to point out explicitly
that derogation cannot happenwhere the arguments put forward stem from the
domestic legal order. This assessment is independent of whether the objective
is an essential one or not.
On the basis of the previous discussion an answer to the third question
whether the outcome would have been the same had the directives pursued
different objectives, is hard to give. In the Court’s eyes there are certainly
other essential objectives of the Union, which suggests that the outcome could
have been the same. On the other hand, the facts of the case are quite unusual
in that an environmental assessment had to be carried out for a measure
designed to protect the environment and not, as in typical cases, for measures
potentially resulting in negative consequences for the environment, such as
47. Available at: <www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582311/05-tesm2.en12.pdf>
[accessed 27 Nov. 2012].
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construction or mining. But given the lack of principled guidance on the
identification of such objectives, one can only be left to guess.
One further point should be made in this context. The Court allowed a
temporary derogation only where the four conditions mentioned above are
satisfied. While the first three conditions are not surprising, the final
condition is that the effects of the measure may only be maintained for the
period of time strictly necessary to remedy the irregularity. But what if the
irregularity is not remedied swiftly? Clearly, Belgiumwould be in breach of its
obligations underDirective 2001/42, which explainswhy theCourt is adamant
that the violation is removed as quickly as possible. Yet would a finding that
the violation has not been removed quickly force Belgium to annul the
contested decision?TheCourt’s decision appears to suggest this, but of course
the problem of a legal vacuum would not disappear in the meantime. Thus the
fourth condition should probably be regarded as a reminder to the Walloon
Region that a swift resolution of the breach, which had been found in joined
cases C-105/09 and C-110/09, is necessary.
6. Conclusions
The Court’s decision in Inter-Environnement leaves a number of questions
open. It has been argued here that the approach of the Court of and the
Advocate General based on the national procedural autonomy of the
Member States is not convincing since this case is not about the application
of a mandatory national procedural rule. Rather it is concerned with
whether a facultative procedural rule can be applied in order to uphold a
substantive objective of EU law. It will remain to be seen whether the
Court’s affirmative answer to the Conseil d’Etat’s question will lead to new
challenges to procedural obligations determined by EU law on the basis of
allegedly overriding substantive goals. Most of these challenges are likely to
remain unsuccessful since the decision must be understood as a confir-
mation of the Court’s earlier case law on the consequences of failures to
carry out an environmental assessment. This means that, save for unusual
situations such as the one in this case, national courts are obliged to either
revoke or suspend a planning permission or to annul a plan or programme
granted without a required prior environmental assessment. In addition, the
judgment should not be understood as having the wider implication that
there is a right to derogate from Directives where essential objectives of the
Union need to be protected. It is clear from Winner Wetten and Commission
v. Poland that Member States must comply with their obligations under EU
law. Only where the reasons are intrinsic to EU law, i.e. have nothing to do
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with the legal order of the Member State, might such derogation be allowed
to take place in the future. Furthermore, Inter-Environnement is an unusual
case. It is unlikely that a similar factual scenario where compliance with the
duty to annul a national measure adopted in contravention of a directive
would automatically lead to a breach of an obligation flowing from another
directive will reach the Court again in the near future. As the examples of
Winner Wetten and Commission v. Poland show, most cases concern the
primacy of EU law over the law of the Member States. It is unfortunate that
the Court did not exploit the unusual facts better and did not solve the case
in a more principled manner.
Nonetheless, it is submitted that the Court has reached a “correct” result. It
managed to avoid a gap in the effective protection of the environment against
pollution caused by nitrates by allowing the referring court to temporarily
uphold the contested decision.An annulment of the action programme against
nitrates would have left theWalloon regionwithout any suchmeasure in place,
which might have resulted in serious environmental damage. Furthermore,
there is no guarantee that the action programmewould be any different after an
environmental assessment has been carried out.Thus the Court had to balance
whether the environment would be better off if the action programme was
annulled with immediate effect or if it was upheld and the procedural defect
were remedied as quickly as possible, and it came to a convincing conclusion.
With this in mind, one is left to wonder why the environmental organizations
who were claimants in these proceedings insisted on the annulment of the
contested order knowing that a legal vacuum would ensue. Perhaps they
shared the stance taken by theAdvocate General and presumed that a measure
subject to an assessment would be more favourable to the environment.48 But
even if that is indeed so, some programme managing the nitrates in
groundwater is better than none. Thus the litigation tactics of the claimants
remain a mystery.
Tobias Lock*
48. Opinion, para 40.
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